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When the End Justifies the Means: Raphaël Lemkin and the Shaping
of a Popular Discourse on Genocide
Anton Weiss-Wendt

The Norwegian Holocaust Center
Oslo, Norway

Everyone has an opinion when being asked what is genocide. More recently, the word genocide
was used with regard to the sluggish reaction of British authorities to the Grenfell Tower fire,
to the European handling of the refugee crisis, the intensified logging in the Amazon rainforest,
Ukraine’s conduct in Donbass, and so on. Even those who might have heard the name of Raphaël
Lemkin in conjunction with the Genocide Convention would not necessarily identify him as the
one who had shaped a popular discourse on genocide.
Raphaël Lemkin is a fascinating case study in its own right. It rarely happens than an individual
who had been cast into oblivion not only makes a powerful comeback but also posthumously
shapes his self-image. The appeal of Lemkin is easy to explain. The world, which appears to be
hanging in the balance, desperately needs heroes. Lemkin represents just the right archetype—a
private citizen and refugee from the Nazis who, despite all odds, persevered in seeing through a
major international treaty. This is how Lemkin presented his story in numerous articles, statements,
and last but not least an unfinished autobiography (which is now available as proper book). What
followed also neatly fit into a standard discursive thread: unrecognized by his contemporaries,
Lemkin has cemented his place in history as an idealistic humanitarian. The story as told by Lemkin
has been serialized in numerous accounts, both academic and popular. The heroic image of Lemkin
has certain variations, depends on the author. Thus, we have the Lemkin as a founding father of
genocide studies (Adam Jones), the Lemkin as a central figure in the development of international
humanitarian law (William Korey, Steven Jacobs, Philippe Sands), the Lemkin as the noble Pole
(Ryszard Szawłowski, Marek Kornat), the Lemkin as a Jewish prodigal son (John Cooper), and
the Lemkin as the crusader for the rights of the suppressed minorities (Roman Serbyn, Colin Tatz).
Whatever perspective these and other authors take, they all agree that, in essence, no Raphaël
Lemkin—no Genocide Convention. This view is shared also by the present author. What I object to
is making Lemkin, wittingly or unwittingly, into a saintly figure.
The lack of critical perspectives is easy to understand, too. Lemkin’s credentials as the de
facto creator of the Genocide Convention seem to give him special status. Lemkin’s life story, as
narrated by the protagonist himself, makes for an animated classroom discussion. What works
well for educators, however, is hard to challenge by academics. Sure enough, subjecting Lemkin,
his ideas and actions, to critical examination is never a goal in itself, particularly if we recognize
that iconoclasm is effectively a mirror image of sanctification. The intention is to merely move
away from hagiography. Moreover, we should keep in mind that the issue at stake is not so much
Lemkin’s personality but his role in shaping the Genocide Convention. It is a common wisdom that
the Genocide Convention is an imperfect instrument of international criminal law. Consequently,
the real question is what went wrong and why. In that case, the question can be reformulated as
follows: can the success or failure of the Genocide Convention—if we choose to speak in absolute
terms—be attributed to the way Lemkin had approached it. As we have learned a lot about the
“success” in the past twenty or so years, it is about time we talk about the “failure.”
In this article I chose to tackle one specific aspect of the Genocide Convention, namely the
mechanisms via which the word genocide, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, entered public discourse.
The general answer to that question I have already provided: Raphaël Lemkin should be credited not
only with the adoption of the genocide treaty but also with bringing the genocide discourse to the
masses, consciously simplifying it in the process. This oversimplification, as I have argued earlier,
has largely to do with the Cold War.1 The Cold War superimposed a dichotomy. International law,
by definition, supersedes the black-and-white division of the world into two ideological camps.
Lemkin, as an individual and legal scholar, was bound by personal and professional ethics. In both
1
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cases, it proved an ideal situation, which did not pass reality check. The result we know, sadly:
eventual disappointment, if not despair, in the case of Lemkin, and a hollowed out international
humanitarian treaty in the case of the Genocide Convention. None of this is visible to the naked
eye, of course. What we routinely encounter, though, is the rhetorical use of genocide, which refers
back to the Cold War, and Raphaël Lemkin.
The article is based on my recent research on the Genocide Convention. Lemkin had left
behind a significant paper trail. His personal papers are complimented by the American and British
governmental records. Former Soviet archives hold essentially nothing on Lemkin, for the simple
reason that he, the self-described “unofficial man,” was not backed by the power of the state—the
only kind the Soviets respected. Due to space constraints, I will illustrate Lemkin’s embrace of
rhetoric as an argumentative devise on the following four examples: pushing for the deletion of
political groups from the wording of the Genocide Convention, seeking the prerequisite twenty
ratification to make the treaty fully operational, discussing “Soviet genocide,” and fighting off the
notion that the treatment of black Americans constituted a genocide.
Erasing Political Groups from the Draft Genocide Convention
First order of the day is to state that the idea of an international genocide convention, backed
by the newly established United Nations, occurred to Lemkin first in 1946, after he had failed
to convince the American and British prosecutors at Nuremberg to charge major Nazi war
criminals, among other crimes, with genocide. Indeed, the path to the Genocide Convention was
not as straightforward as Lemkin wanted everyone to believe.2 Mark Lewis was perhaps the first
scholar to point out that the new delicts of barbarism and vandalism that Lemkin had proposed
in 1933 were in conjunction with the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
presently in the works.3 Lewis, and more recently Douglas Irvin-Erickson, have emphasized that
the codification of international criminal law (of which the future Genocide Convention is but one
example) developed simultaneously along several tracks and involved many a scholar.4
Neither does Lemkin’s 1944 book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis
of Government, Proposals for Redress, strike as extremely original when seen from a comparative
perspective. Certainly, it was among the first, but not only, such analyses of the criminal Nazi
regime.5 After all is said and done, the chapter on genocide—which Axis Rule in Occupied Europe is
mainly known for today—takes up a mere 16 pages in a book of 671 pages. Put into a perspective,
Lemkin’s ultimate tragedy was that, following the publication of his book, he built his life
exclusively around the concept of genocide.6 As Lemkin had moved toward the self-imposed goal
of making the Genocide Convention a reality, he progressively compromised and cut lose even
his closest associates whose opinions might be just slightly different from his.7 A person, a scholar,
a lobbyist, and/or an amateur diplomat—in whatever capacity Lemkin had appeared, it was all
subordinated to a single goal.
2
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In retrospect, the last fourteen years of Lemkin’s life, 1946 to 1959, epitomize the different
stages in the struggle for the Genocide Convention: seeing the draft convention through the
United Nations, 1946–48; securing the prerequisite twenty ratifications to make the convention
operational, 1949–51; and influencing the United States to ratify the convention, 1951–59 (actually,
from 1949). I date the beginning of a slippery path of compromise for Lemkin by summer of 1947.
From that time onward, Lemkin had showed again and again that he was willing to cast overboard,
well, not everything but certainly a lot in order to reach his ultimate objective. It all began with
the original clause in the draft Genocide Convention that extended protection, among others, to
political groups.
The original suggestion to omit political groups from the Genocide Convention reportedly
came from the World Jewish Congress, an umbrella organization comprising Jewish agencies
in fifty-seven countries. This recommendation was made, according to Lemkin, to eliminate the
source of contention caused by differences of opinion as to what constitutes a political group and
ultimately to secure adoption of the treaty.8 In fact, this initiative belonged to Lemkin himself.
Lemkin’s dissenting opinion was entered in the UN Secretariat draft Genocide Convention of June
26, 1947: “One of the experts consulted, Professor Lemkin, voiced some doubts, however, on the
advisability of including political groups. He pointed out, on the one hand, that political groups
have not the permanency and the specific characteristics of the other groups referred to and, on the
other hand, that the Convention on Genocide being of general interest, it should not run the risk of
failure by introducing ideas on which the world is deeply divided.”9
On July 8, 1947, he further argued in a letter to Hartley Shawcross, member of the UK
delegation to the United Nations, that “political groups do not belong here organically.” The
decision of the World Jewish Congress to lobby for exclusion of political groups was made on
the behest of Lemkin two weeks earlier. According to John Cooper, by striking down political
groups Lemkin sought to appease the Soviets and their affiliates.10 And he did, at least indirectly.
In May 1948 Aron Trainin, top Soviet expert on genocide, specifically referred to Lemkin when
arguing that political groups were fluid and therefore persecution on political grounds did not
constitute genocide.11 With regard to political groups, even Lemkin’s closest associates were
astonished that he was “willing to throw anything and everything overboard in order to save a
ship.”12 Consistent backpedaling on the issue of political groups began in late May 1948. The stark
opposition to the inclusion of political groups voiced by Britain, Latin American countries, and
the Soviet Union—pinpointed James N. Rosenberg, chairman of the American Committee for an
International Genocide Convention—might kill the entire project as it was about to be considered
by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and later by the General Assembly. So serious
were the objections by certain delegations that obtaining a two-thirds majority in the Assembly
appeared unlikely. The committee therefore reversed its earlier position regarding political groups
and set out to persuade the US State Department to do the same.13
8
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Lemkin and his front organization, the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention,
continued pressing the State Department to drop the ball on political groups throughout 1948.
By omitting this “controversial issue,” according to Lemkin, governments would demonstrate
“true statesmanship.”14 Eventually, Lemkin (along with the Communist bloc and Latin American
delegations) had succeeded in sticking down political groups from the wording of the Genocide
Convention. Subsequently, the absence of political groups among those protected by the convention
proved a major stumbling block to US ratification, which Lemkin had tirelessly urged.
Ratification of the Genocide Convention at Any Cost
Once Lemkin reneged on one core element of the Genocide Convention, it became easier to
misinterpret the others, whenever it fit his purposes. In accordance with article XIII of the Genocide
Convention, it would come into force after twenty instruments of ratification or accession will have
been deposited. Lemkin took it upon himself to secure those twenty ratifications/accessions, by
all means possible. His modus operandi was simple, as it was effective: to tell foreign diplomats,
state officials, public figures, or just anyone who was willing to listen what they wanted to
hear. Essentially, it means designating this or that particular case as genocide, depends on the
respondent. And so Lemkin canvassed the world history, the twentieth century in particular, as a
history of genocide.
It should probably be mentioned that, from Lemkin’s perspective, on a conceptual level, it
was not even that big of a sin, since in his 1944 book he defined genocide rather broadly.15 It is
just that, from early on, it was obvious to both UN officials and state representatives engaged in
negotiations around the Genocide Convention in 1947–48 that the initial draft—broadly painted
after Axis Rule in Occupied Europe—had to be scaled down to even approach the contours of an
international convention.16 In other words, the text of the Genocide Convention was not identical to
chapter 9 in Lemkin’s book. Lemkin knew it, and yet went ahead and interpreted the former as if it
was the latter. In moral terms, it may be called self-righteous deception.
Lemkin was once quoted as saying: “I study my men and I use the approach that fits them
best. I might flatter them or I might argue with them. If they like music, I talk about music but
we always get around to genocide in the end. If it will accomplish the purpose, I’m even willing
to bore them until they say yes just to get rid of me.”17 The way Lemkin operated was common
knowledge. As a newspaper reporter once remarked, “most of Professor Lemkin’s work has been
the behind-the-scenes and off-the-record kind.”18 In December 1948 Lemkin sought additional
details from Pakistan’s Foreign Minister concerning the charge of genocide the latter’s country
made against India in the United Nations back in February.19 Fourteen months later Lemkin was
trying to convince the permanent representative of India to the United Nations that his country
should ratify the genocide treaty, for “obviously there can be no success of this convention without
the leadership of India.”20 Finland was well aware of the problem of genocide, stated Lemkin,
because it had to absorb ethnic Finns from the Soviet-acquired Karelia in 1940.21 Japan must ratify
the Genocide Convention in view of the plight of Japanese prisoners of war kept captive in China
shortly changed its name to the US Committee for a UN Genocide Convention and functioned as a front for Lemkin’s
ideas and strategies.
14
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and the Soviet Union, he insisted.22 In his letter to the newly elected Lord Mayor of Dublin, Lemkin
evoked the Irish Potato Famine of 1845–52.23 Following a phone conversation with Lemkin in
January 1952, James Mandalian related “latest genocidal developments in Soviet Armenia” to the
executive committee of the organization he had represented, the Hairenik Association.24 When
trying to convince Turkish diplomats that their country should ratify the convention, however,
Lemkin carefully avoided mentioning the Armenians.25
Lemkin must have been pleased that Yugoslavia, though nominally a socialist country, in
August 1950 ratified the Genocide Convention. Remarkably, since the Stalin-Tito split in 1948,
Yugoslav authorities, both at home and in the United Nations, had consistently accused the Soviet
Union of genocide, evoking specifically ethnic deportations.26 The fact that the Yugoslavs went
after the Soviets, however, proved immaterial to Lemkin. Shortly after Yugoslavia’s ratification, he
swiftly rallied Italian émigré organizations in the United States. Acting on his behest, the Order of
Sons of Italy urged US President Harry Truman using the “civilizing purpose” of the treaty to help
out the peoples behind the iron curtain. As to the specific interest of Italy and ethnic Italians in the
convention, the latter was said to be the only legal tool for the protection of the Italian minority
in Yugoslavia. If Italy ratified the Genocide Convention, in accordance with Article VIII, it could
bring charges against Yugoslavia without being a member of the United Nations. In reference to
Catholicism, Lemkin inserted passages on the “Christian idea” and the “treaty devoted to God.”
The Order of Sons of Italy conveyed Lemkin’s idea of the convention becoming an integral part of
American foreign policy as an excellent instrument in the fight against communism.27
Along the way, Lemkin turned the anti-colonial argument on its head. In the case of Italy, it
was no longer the crimes committed by the colonial power against the indigenous population of
Eritrea, but the eminent threat to the Italian minority there following the withdrawal of the British
troops. Naturally, argued Lemkin, the only “international law protecting the Italian minorities
from the natives” was the Genocide Convention.28 When implying genocidal threat emanating from
the indigenous North-African population, Lemkin was likely referring to crimes unimaginable
attributed to them by…the Benito Mussolini regime, as a justification for the invasion of Abyssinia.
A copy of the Italian government’s memorandum from 1935 is to be found among Lemkin’s papers.
Apparently, he kept it because of the mention of “Abyssinian barbarism” (as a subtle affirmation
of his proposed international crime of barbarism), which listed slavery, torture, cannibalism, and
“deliberate and specific hostility towards Italy.”29
Talking about any given case, Lemkin might sound melodramatic at one time, and scholarly
at another. Yugoslavia played a role also in the Greek civil war, which raged between 1946 and
1949, and in the postwar settlement. The issue at hand was the forced transfer of Greek children
into Communist countries that the government in Athens, and Lemkin, had cultivated as a case
of genocide.30 Lemkin had subsequently admitted that he used the story of children in the civil
war as a means of achieving Greek ratification of the Genocide Convention.31 As he put it in a
letter to one of his Greek respondents in July 1949, the transfer of Greek children was a good
“illustration for Article II of the convention.” Writing to Helen Moschou, he said women should
be particularly interested in the Genocide Convention “because of the family problems involved.”
Moschou reacted most enthusiastically, praising Lemkin for his efforts to bring “those desperate
“UN: Japan Reminded on Genocide Convention,” Jiji Press, n.d., AJA, Box 2, Folder 2.
Raphäel Lemkin, “Letter to Robert Briscoe,” June 28, 1956, AJA, Box 2, Folder 2.
24
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25
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26
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27
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28
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young Greek children” back to their country and parents. Indeed, this treaty would provide a legal
basis for the restoration of the Greek children and we do it together, Lemkin assured her.32
While playing on the maternal instincts of potential female supporters, Lemkin chose a more
legalistic tone when appealing to the well-known Greek international lawyers Jean Spiropolous
and Peter Vallindas. He let both men know that women’s organizations were eager to bring up
the case of the Greek children in support of the Genocide Convention. The illegal retention of
these children was criminal, highlighting genocide as a heinous crime, argued Lemkin. His letters
inevitably ended with the request to expedite Greece’s ratification.33 The ratification might become
the first act of the newly elected parliament, “dramatizing before the world the plight of the Greek
mothers and Greek children.” This act would help to establish genocide as an international crime,
Lemkin wrote to Archbishop Michael (Konstantinides), head of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese
of North and South America, “a crime which affected tragically the modern history of our beloved
Greece, a crime under which now many children still suffer.”34 In an undated paper, Lemkin spoke
of “wrenching children from their mothers’ bosoms” and of Greece appealing to the “criminals
to disgorge their human loot.” He compared the sacrifice of some twenty-five thousand innocent
Greek children to the Moloch of Communism to the Munich appeasement.35
The Notion of Soviet Genocide as a Means of Getting the Americans Onboard
Lemkin could never imagine he would stumble over something that initially appeared self-evident:
ratification of the Genocide Convention by the United States. For over ten years, until he breathed
his last, Lemkin was fighting an uphill battle. To win the argument, he put his integrity on the line.
Eventually, he lost both.
The opposition to US ratification rested on two kinds of arguments, legal and political,
bridged by a conspicuous Nativist element. The critics, including the influential American Bar
Association, compared prospective ratification of the Genocide Convention to an imposition of a
world government on the United States. International law would thus supersede state laws and
eventually threaten constitutional freedoms enjoyed by American citizens. The act of ratification,
they speculated, would enable the Communist bloc to formally charge the United States for
genocide before the United Nations. That would be plain grotesque, since the only country
presently committing genocide was reportedly the Soviet Union—unaccountable for its crimes
thanks to the omission of political groups from the convention’s wording.36 To disarm the powerful
opposition, Lemkin came to argue the exact opposite, namely that the Soviet Union can be indicted
for genocide and that, reversely, no comparable crimes ever taken place in the United States.
Regardless the charging situation, both domestically and internationally, Lemkin had refused to
modify his argument, whose sole objective was to make the United States ratify the Genocide
Convention and thus salvage it. He picked his words, and his allies, to fit his argument.
Since the Soviet Union occupied such a prominent role in the argumentation against US
ratification of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin made it a centerpiece of his lobbying campaign.
Until his death, Lemkin single-mindedly promoted the thesis that the Soviet/Imperial Russian
state was inherently genocidal. For support, he turned to East European émigré organizations,
which could be instrumental in indicting the Soviet Union for genocide. He played a pivotal role
in recasting gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity, which had occurred with
frightening persistency during the period of late Stalinism, in the light of genocide. By the time of
the US Senate hearings on ratification in early 1950 Lemkin had annoyed a number of prominent
politicians by his aggressive lobbying. As a result, despite his prominence in the field, Lemkin was

32
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not called to testify.37 Undeterred, he resorted to couching representatives of ethnic organizations
who were expected to appear in the hearings. With remarkable candidness Lemkin stated that
support for the Genocide Convention (which he had painstakingly cultivated) should appear
spontaneous in the eyes of the Senators. As he explained: “The concept of genocide is very rich.
Every angle—religion, economy, humanity, womanhood as victims, dictatorship, communism,
Russia’s victims—all these should be brought to the attention of America and the world through
these hearings.”38 To quote Mark Mazower, Lemkin “played more and more shamelessly to the
anticommunist gallery.”39
Lemkin’s relationship with East European émigrés was that of give and take. He encouraged
ethnic organizations to take the issue of “Soviet genocide” to the highest political level, the United
Nations and the Senate, in order to make US politicians act on the Genocide Convention. The
émigrés, for their part, appreciated an extra opportunity to rally under the guise of genocide
against the continuous Soviet domination. The Lithuanian émigré organizations demonstrated
remarkable cohesiveness and excellent lobbying skills, and thus quickly found a common language
with Lemkin. Indeed, the two established a mutually beneficial partnership. Lemkin had received
institutional and financial support from the Lithuanian émigrés, in return providing them with legal
advice. As he noted in his unfinished autobiography: “I organize the Lithuanians in Chicago.”40
In June 1951 Lemkin opened an exhibition on genocide in Lithuania, organized by the
Lithuanian American Council in Cleveland. When describing the “appalling material on
extermination of the captive nations” (without mentioning that he had helped to write up the
exhibition text), Lemkin related a nebulous story of Soviet authorities “importing” ethnic Kalmyks
and Russians to replace Lithuanian deportees. Reportedly, those “imported persons” assumed not
only the family name of the deportee but also the position of a husband and father of the distressed
family. In conclusion, Lemkin urged to “include genocide as a concept carrying the highest moral
condemnation in our cold war against the Soviet Union.”41 The exhibition was chronologically
divided into three sections: the first Soviet occupation of 1940‒41, the Nazi occupation of 1941‒44,
and the second Soviet occupation from 1944 onward. One element that was conspicuously missing
in the exhibition was the mass murder of about 196,000 Jews by the Nazis and their Lithuanian
collaborators.42 Lemkin, who lost forty-seven of his relatives in the Holocaust, apparently did not
insist.
As with many other instances of Stalinist terror, the original idea to place the 1940 Katyn
massacre in the specter of genocide came from Lemkin. In December 1949 he pitched reviving
public attention to the Katyn case to the Polish American Congress. To entice the Poles, Lemkin
casually mentioned that the Lithuanians had already settled on bringing up “genocide perpetrated
now on the Lithuanian people by Soviet Russia” before the Senate subcommittee. If president of
the organization agreed to participate in the forthcoming Senate hearings, Lemkin suggested, he
might be able to incorporate the Katyn case in the proceedings.43 Consequently, a letter from the
Polish American Congress that drew a parallel between “Nazi genocide in Auschwitz and Soviet
genocide in Katyn” was entered as part of the official record.44
Lemkin’s engagement with the émigrés was not purely intellectual. The Ukrainians and the
Lithuanians, in particular, regularly sent him checks. In fact, from the early 1950s onward, when
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Lemkin found himself increasingly in isolation, the financial support from the East European
émigré organizations essentially remained his only source of income. Lemkin was due in taxes
for the year 1948, and was given extension on his tax-return for the following five years. Whereas
in 1951 close to 70 percent of Lemkin’s gross income came from two Jewish organizations—the
Littauer Foundation and the American Jewish Congress—in 1952 the Lithuanian and Ukrainian
émigré organizations—along with the National Committee for a Free Europe—contributed over 90
percent.45 Without unduly emphasizing the sense of obligation that Lemkin might have felt toward
his donors, the much-needed cash injection made it difficult to end dependence. The money Lemkin
had received effectively came from the CIA. Independent of that fact, he presented the National
Committee for a Free Europe, the Voice of America, and the Crusade for Freedom—all propaganda
spinoffs of the CIA—as the captive nations’ “symbol of hope for survival from genocide.”46
Like many in the West at the time, Lemkin cultivated the Nazi-Soviet equation. He was keen on
explaining to the American people that “genocide is what Hitler did to the Jews and what Stalin is
doing in the Soviet-dominated countries.”47 Equipped with the anecdotal evidence of persecution
of Jews in the Soviet Union, Lemkin spoke with conviction about a “unified plan and conspiracy
to destroy the Jewish communities in all of Eastern Europe.” He insisted that Soviet policies went
far beyond conventional anti-Semitism. Applying dubious logic, he argued that even the use of
the expression Soviet anti-Semitism was incorrect: although anti-Semitism existed also in some
democratic countries, it would be wrong to put them on the same level with Russia.48 Anti-Zionist
and anti-Israeli disposition, according to Lemkin, was just one phase in the long-term Soviet policy
of genocide that went back to 1941.49 He recalled the passivity of the international community in
the face of the Nazi genocide, allowing Hitler to murder the Jews with impunity. “The world must
not repeat this tragic mistake of the past,” he concluded, “the Soviet Union is waiting with great
interest to observe the reaction of the world before it will proceed further.”50
Lemkin described the Slánský trial, not utterly without a reason, a “judicial murder.”51 The fact
that the indictment mentioned the ethnicity of the defendants made Lemkin speak of annihilation
of the Jews. Although “genocide” had only affected individual Jews so far, Soviet propaganda—
which according to Lemkin had assumed dimensions and techniques applied earlier by Julius
Streicher and Joseph Goebbels—could prompt the destruction of the entire Jewry. Due to a tsarist
“pogrom tradition” and the Bolshevik doctrine, Russian soil was saturated with Jewish blood,
so that the local population could be easily aroused to participate in a large-scale genocide. The
ongoing action against the Jews was not an isolated phenomenon, Lemkin insisted, since the
Russians had already exterminated one-third of the Baltic population and the entire Muslim
population of the Crimea.52
To fit the moment, Lemkin constructed his case around Soviet satellites—Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and Hungary—which had allegedly set out to destroy their Jewish minorities. He charged
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the Czechoslovakian authorities with murdering innocent Jews placed on trial in Prague (without
mentioning that they had occupied important positions in the Communist hierarchy). According
to Lemkin, the defendants were administered drugs for the purpose of extorting confessions. He
claimed that the communist rulers incited genocide by distributing posters that read “Hang the
Jews!” From the proceedings of the Prague trial he inferred the intention to destroy the entire
Jewish population of Czechoslovakia, and eventually all the Jewish communities behind the Iron
Curtain. Ultimately, Lemkin wanted to take up the case of the “communist genocide campaign
against the Jews and other victimized peoples” before the United Nations.53 Yet another time,
Lemkin rallied support for the legal and political defense of Israel in the United Nations and other
diplomatic settings. He implied that Jews living in the Middle East and Europe, and specifically
Germany, were in mortal danger. The Genocide Convention was the only international tool for the
protection of the Jews worldwide, Lemkin predictably concluded.54
The idea of the immutability of the body politic is one of many flaws in totalitarianism
theory (popularized through Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book). In the Soviet context, it meant that
the comprehensive system of terror introduced under Stalin was constant. Lemkin had refused to
recognize any changes in Soviet policy in the aftermath of Stalin’s death. Lemkin did not believe
that Georgy Malenkov—who had won the leadership contest in Moscow—sought a new war any
more than Stalin had, but ominously added that, “he will carry on the Russian practice of genocide
which destroys nations.”55 For Lemkin’s life-long project, it seems, the existence of Soviet antipode
was essential. During the college roundtable, “Genocide: The Newest Soviet Crime,” in late January
1953, Lemkin proposed establishing a special UN investigative committee that would look into
that matter. According to Lemkin, “It will permit the United Nations to condemn the Communist
leaders for the crime of genocide and render a verdict of which history will be proud…The great
and historic importance of the Genocide Pact lies in the fact that it permits us to meet the present
Communist barbarity not on the level of a discussion of “dialectical materialism” of Karl Marx but
on the level of common criminality of an Al Capone and his like.”56
As late as November 1956, Lemkin still held a singular explanation as to the Soviet plans
for some one hundred million East Europeans. The Russians could not possibly “digest” such a
large number of people belonging to a higher “civilization,” he reasoned. Therefore, they allegedly
intended to destroy some 25 percent of the East European population, so that the rest should
“surrender in passivity as an amorphous mass of slaves.” It had already happened, according to
Lemkin, in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Genocide Convention was the only international
legal instrument capable of keeping the captive nations alive. Every parliament had to raise that
issue in order to reveal the full scope of Soviet Genocide, Lemkin concluded.57
What is particularly sticking is that the Soviets, who Lemkin had consistently taunted, had
barely anything to say about him. A marginal note appeared in the Russian translation of We
Charged Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People. A Petition to the United Nations
originally published in 1951 by the far left Civil Rights Congress. Soviet critics dismissed Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe for having failed to adequately present the scope of Nazi atrocities. They
pinpointed that out of the 671 pages in the book only 15 addressed the Nazi crimes committed
against the Soviet people. Lemkin’s biographical sketch was even less flattering: a Polish immigrant,
Lemkin had settled down in the United States. Currently (i.e., 1947) he treads the boards as a legal
expert in the UN Secretariat, while being an ardent supporter of American imperialist policies.58
Counterintuitively perhaps, the Soviets simply did not bother. One reason as to such apparent
indifference I already outlined in the introduction. Concomitant explanation is that Stalin’s regime,
once it essentially got its way on the Genocide Convention back in 1948, no longer regarded it a
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major issue. Finally, the self-image of a diehard anticommunist that Lemkin had projected was
simply not believable.
Lemkin was anticommunist for hire, and a composite picture of the communist regime that
he had painted with the help of ethnic organizations in the United States resembled a caricature.
Instead of pointing out specific elements of destruction within the narrower meaning of genocide
(however heavily edited it had emerged from the UN floor), Lemkin and his supporters settled for
emotional emphasis. Thus, they chose to speak of “destroying the soul of the Ukrainian nation”
rather than to explore the circumstances of the 1932–33 famine; they were fascinated with the
vicious rhetoric of the Moscow show trials, but failed to grasp the scope of the Great Terror; they
focused on the high-profile Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia, but neglected the political undercurrent
of Soviet anti-Semitism; they dwelled on ethnic mass deportations, but only used platitudes to
describe the victims’ final destination—the Gulag.
Racial Discrimination in the United States as a Liability
As of the late 1940s, racial segregation was a part of everyday life in the American South, enforced
by Jim Crow laws. It was almost inevitable that some commentators in the United States eventually
raised the question whether any of the discriminatory practices could be framed as genocide. Lemkin
became aware of this reading of the Genocide Convention shortly after it had been adopted. Could
a country signatory to the convention bring charges of genocide against the members of a lynching
mob, say, in Mississippi, was inquiring in February 1949 Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee.59 When does homicide become genocide, another individual was asking
Lemkin in January 1950. If a southern town of some two hundred inhabitants lynched every black
in the town, could it be regarded as evidence of intent to destroy a group?60 Lemkin steadfastly
rebuked such propositions. Those lawyers who thought that “two or three negroes walking in
the street” constituted the sociological concept of a racial group were confused. “Two negroes”
were not representative of the entire “racial negro group of America,” whereas discrimination was
different from annihilation.61 This was a strong rebuttal from someone who just a year earlier had
argued that the “killing of fifty persons is also genocide.”62 Writing to Gertrude Samuels of the
New York Times, Lemkin went even further in his confutation. “For America, genocide is an outside
crime,” he stated in June 1950, “it is like African leprosy.” According to Lemkin, the suggestion that
the United States was committing genocide against the blacks amounted to slander.63 Curiously,
in a speech before the American Jewish Congress some half a year later, Lemkin said in reference
to the Korean War that “the present gigantic struggle in Asia carries in itself the seeds of genocide
and its victim finally will be nobody else but the White Man.”64
Lemkin could barely contain his anger when he learned of We Charge Genocide: The Crime of
Government against the Negro People. Available in both a book and a petition format, We Charge
Genocide advanced a twofold thesis. On the one hand, it argued that the failure to ratify the
Genocide Convention exposed genocide against the Negro people as a policy of the United States
Government. On the other, it insisted that the obligation to implement the convention was not
conditional upon ratification, superseding every state law in conflict with its provisions.65 Lemkin
slammed the book/petition as erroneously titled, the result of confused thinking, or more likely a
maladroit attempt to back up Soviet accusations concerning the US treatment of American Negros.
We Charge Genocide “wantonly misinterpreted and maliciously confused” civil rights of individuals
with the destruction of entire groups as covered by the Genocide Convention, he fumed.66
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The Baltimore Afro-American bitterly remarked that the US press had passed the petition in
silence, giving publicity exclusively to Lemkin.67 The latter suggested in the New York Times that
the accusations leveled against the US Government was a “maneuver to divert attention from the
crimes of genocide committed against Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and other Sovietsubjugated peoples.” William L. Patterson, executive chairman of the Civil Rights Congress,
retorted that “Dr. Lemkin was attempting to put the shoe he held on the wrong foot.68 This
juxtaposition was not out of place. Unwittingly, Lemkin plunged himself into race politics. The
1948 Displaced Persons Act authorized the admission into the United States of up to two hundred
thousand people, including former citizens of the Baltic countries. By December 1951 some 48,000
displayed persons from Estonia and Latvia entered the United States. Many Latvians ended up
working as cotton pickers in Dixieland, encouraged by white plantation owners. As Bernard J.
Maegi has argued, planters chose Latvians primarily on racial grounds, to offset organized black
labor. Arriving in the Mississippi Delta as victims of the totalitarian regimes, ethnic Latvians were
effectively viewed as a racial bulwark. Their anticommunism fit well with the similar sentiment on
the rise in the United States. When it came to civil rights movement, they found themselves on the
opposite pole from blacks.69
Lemkin’s position decisively pitched him against civil rights activists. In his June 1953 Op-ed
in the New York Times, Lemkin disparagingly dismissed the suggestion that genocide might apply
to the treatment of black Americans by white majority. Oakley C. Johnson, one of the signatories to
the 1951 petition, accused Lemkin of playing down the scope of racial discrimination in the United
States. White Americans were not just threatening one or several black persons, he wrote, but were
terrorizing an entire racial minority. Johnson turned around the link between the Nazi and Soviet
crimes that Lemkin had variously promoted. If genocide was a rare crime of great magnitude, as
Lemkin insisted, then only the destruction of all members of a certain group would qualify as such.
Would that mean that the Nazis did not commit genocide after all? Johnson asked rhetorically,
since several million Jews were still alive? Lemkin argued in the Op-ed that American blacks were
on the road to prosperity; but so were German Jews, contended Johnson. The consistent effort to
superimpose white supremacy by means of laws, police, and courts had a potential element of
genocide to it, he concluded.70 Lemkin, however, stuck to his earlier opinion that neither racial
discrimination nor specifically lynching constituted genocide in the absence of the element of
intent. “Only segregation with purposes similar to those motivating Nazi use of concentration and
labor camps would violate the treaty agreement,” he contended somewhat intangibly.71
Conclusion
What is normally called vanity, in the case of Lemkin was also a tragedy. He kept referring to the
Genocide Convention as his child, and it effectively was, his one and only child. He burned his
bridges behind himself; he could not fall back on what most of his peers could: family and close
friends, ethnic community, and/or teaching career. In effect, Lemkin locked himself in an empty
room with only, essentially, a flawed, difficult to apply international treaty for company. It did
affect his state of mind. Thus, the concluding part of Lemkin’s unfinished autobiography spoke
extensively of “opposition,” “enemies,” “retribution,” and so on.72
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By the 1950s Lemkin was no longer that idealist professor as some reporters tended to paint
him. Notably, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe was also his last major academic work. Past the short
article in Yale Law Journal in June of 1949 that affectively summarized his findings in the book,
Lemkin had not produced any scholarship.73 Meanwhile examples when Lemkin compromised
his academic integrity are just too many to cite. Take, for example, Lemkin’s nomination for Nobel
Peace Prize. Lemkin was nominated ten consecutive times, beginning in 1950, but never won the
prize. According to the Nobel Prize Committee’s rules, individuals cannot nominate themselves
for the prize, nor are they supposed to be told that they have been nominated. Lemkin flouted the
rules by providing selected individuals with a template, suggesting them to insert the customtailored paragraphs into their respective nomination letters.74 Since the Nobel Peace Committee’s
proceedings are classified, we will never know if anyone ever promoted his own candidacy as
persistently as Lemkin did—probably not.
What Lemkin had written and said during his career, especially since 1945, was beseeched
with contradictions. It is always possible to find corroboration to one’s ideas in Lemkin’s writings,
for the simple reason that Lemkin had adjusted his vocabulary to meet the expectations of those
he was talking to. Lemkin was opposed to any document of international human rights law that
he regarded as contradicting or overlapping with the genocide treaty: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the draft Covenant on Social and Political Rights, the Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labor, and the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
The crux of the problem, as Mira L. Siegelberg has contended, was Lemkin’s commitment to group
protection in a world that had decisively moved in the direction of individual rights. This conclusion
let her pronounce Lemkin—too radically perhaps—as an “outdated remnant from the interwar
period” and his strategy in preserving the purity of the Genocide Convention as “schizophrenic.”75
Lemkin’s original ideas and good intentions do not cancel out the legal and political process that
had transformed them into the Genocide Convention. Chapter 9 in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
is by no means a canonical text.76 As William A. Schabas has recently argued: “Be that as it may,
courts are no more interested in what Lemkin thought about the scope of the term genocide than
they are in what Kant or Montesquieu or Augustine thought about murder and rape. It’s not really
relevant. Legal terms are adopted by lawmakers. Preventing and prosecuting genocide is not about
fidelity to the original vision of Raphaël Lemkin. His 1944 book is not our gospel.”77
Certainly, the Soviet Union and the United States would have discovered the rhetorical power
of genocide without any input from Lemkin. What Lemkin did was bringing the genocide discourse
to the masses. The more people he addressed, the more amorphous became the term genocide. At
some point, he simply lost track of the entire conversation. The issue at stake for Lemkin was
no longer preventing and punishing genocide but identifying specific instance of mass violence
anywhere to illustrate specific articles in the Genocide Convention and thus justify its existence.
By the early 1950s, a popular conception of genocide incorporated anything and everything, from
violation of human rights and forced assimilation to racial discrimination and infringement on the
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freedom of religion.78 I concur with Peter Novick, who has argued that “genocide was a generic
category, and examples could be found to fit the needs of the moment.”79 The man who contributed
most to making it happen is Raphaël Lemkin.
The heroic image of Lemkin requires a major corrective. Lemkin can hardly pose as a raw
model, unless we consider contravening one’s principles and bending ethics a virtue. Lemkin’s
crusade for the Genocide Convention entailed a self-destructing mechanism of a project delineated
by ascribed significance. In a sense, it serves as yet another proof that no goal, whatever noble, can
justify the means.
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